The service claims that if its best practices are followed it would take millions of years to crack a vault's master password.
LastPass notes that encrypted fields remain secured with 256-bit AES encryption and can only be decrypted with a unique encryption key derived from each user's master password. The threat actor was also able to copy a backup of customer vault data from the encrypted storage container which is stored in a proprietary binary format that contains both unencrypted data, such as website URLs, as well as fully-encrypted sensitive fields such as website usernames and passwords, secure notes, and form-filled data. To date, we have determined that once the cloud storage access key and dual storage container decryption keys were obtained, the threat actor copied information from backup that contained basic customer account information and related metadata including company names, end-user names, billing addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, and the IP addresses from which customers were accessing the LastPass service. That information was used to target an employee, obtaining credentials and keys which were used to access and decrypt some storage volumes within the cloud-based storage service.
The attack stems from a security incident in August 2022 when a hacker was able to access some source code and technical information from their development environment.
LastPass recently disclosed that an attacker obtained access to customer password vaults in a severe security breach.
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